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INTRODUCTION
The idea that copyright is a form of intellectual property has been so wellaccepted, for so long, that it seems hard to conceive of any other way to
conceptualize the applicable legal framework. In the last few decades, however, a
number of scholars have questioned the proposition that copyright must necessarily
be rooted entirely in a property paradigm, and have sought to show how, over the
last century and a half or so, that paradigm has been applied increasingly strictly and
its logic has been extended with ever greater force.1 Against this effort, others have
sought to establish that the language and conceptual framework of property have
guided Anglo-American thinking about copyright for a much longer time.2 That
property-based rationales and rhetoric have informed the treatment of copyright

* Associate Professor of Law and English, University of Toronto. For comments on previous drafts,
thanks to Zahr Said, Jessica Silbey, and Bob Spoo—and particularly to Mark Rose for his generous
comments, and Dan Burk both for his comments and for inviting me to participate in a terrific
conference.
1. See, e.g., ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM
GUTENBERG TO GATES (2010); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE
RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2003); Michael
A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004); Neil
W. Netanel, Why Has Copyright Expanded? Analysis and Critique, in 6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN
COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007).
2. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization,
and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993 (2005).
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since the eighteenth century is hardly a novel proposition; every major history of
copyright law that touches on its origins has commented on the significance of such
explanations, particularly in relation to the passage of the Statute of Anne in 1710.3
But what becomes equally evident, from a reading of those histories and of the
contemporaneous sources related to literary commerce more generally, is that the
conception of copyright as a form of property was neither the only, nor even the
dominant, paradigm in circulation at the time. There is, to be sure, a certain amount
of satisfaction to be gained by discovering the word property in eighteenth-century
legal sources, but that discovery marks the beginning, not the end, of any such
analysis, because the question remains who is invoking the concept, and to what
end.
In this article, I suggest that a historical discussion about the nature of
copyright should consider the sources of the various ways of framing the issue. When
the language of property appears among eighteenth-century commentators on
copyright, it makes a difference whether this language comes primarily from judges,
members of the bookselling industry and their lawyers, or writers and their
counsel—or some combination of these. Moreover, the opacity of older sources
may, on occasion, lead to misinterpretations of the case or treatise in which this
language appears. Building on earlier work that traces some aspects of the property
framework as it developed in eighteenth-century British jurisprudence,4 here I show
that writers were far cagier about the language of property than were their colleagues
in the bookselling industry, sometimes adopting this language equivocally,
sometimes repudiating it emphatically. At a minimum, this should lead us to
question the view that the mere presence of this language, in some
contemporaneous legal decisions and pamphlets, shows that a property-based view
was generally understood in the eighteenth century as the proper framework for
understanding copyright.
There is little reason to suppose that property rights furnished the default legal
framework for the “sole Right and Liberty of Printing” protected in the Statute of
Anne, at the time of its passage.5 Before it came to be seen as a synonym for “literary
property,” copyright was a sui generis right, understood according to various
tentative analogies that included both property rights and various personal rights.
The Statute of Anne prohibited unauthorized, verbatim reproduction of books, but

3. See, e.g., RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE
MOVEMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1695–1775) 40–41 (2004)
(noting the emergence of new property-based metaphors, elaborated by Daniel Defoe and members of
the booksellers’ guild, during the first years of the eighteenth century); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON,
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 139–42 (1968) (noting, for instance, that in petitioning
Parliament for the bill, the London guild of booksellers insisted that “their Property . . . should be
provided for”); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 34–41
(1993) (also noting the emergence of new property-based metaphors, elaborated by Daniel Defoe and
members of the booksellers’ guild, during the first years of the eighteenth century).
4. Simon Stern, From Author’s Right to Property Right, 62 U. TORONTO L.J. 29 (2012).
5. Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, pmbl. (Gr. Brit.).
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did not deal with derivative rights and said nothing about originality.6 On its face,
the statute prohibited a certain kind of act—reprinting texts in their entirety—and
hence it could be seen not as protecting ownership of a thing, like an alienable
interest in a chattel, but instead as protecting a personal right of the author.
The prohibition against unauthorized reproduction might be likened to the
right against self-incrimination (insofar as both involve the right not to be
compelled to speak except when and how one chooses) or the right not to be libeled
(insofar as a publication that the author has not sanctioned might result in
reputational harm). The view of copyright as a form of property was advanced
primarily by members of the bookselling industry and their lawyers: their pamphlets
calling for perpetual copyright protection, and their arguments in cases such as
Tonson v. Collins,7 Millar v. Taylor,8 and Donaldson v. Becket,9 insistently pursue that
analogy, which appears only fleetingly elsewhere.
Booksellers were not the only ones who held this view, but it is notable that
very few writers adopted it. Eighteenth-century writers occasionally commented
explicitly on the idea of literary property, but more often they addressed it obliquely
in their work or implicitly in their literary practice. Thus, for example, whereas
Samuel Richardson complained bitterly about sequels and imitations of his novels
(which he considered to be just as illegitimate as unauthorized reprints), various
other writers seem to have considered these practices perfectly acceptable, both for
themselves and their imitators. Richardson’s perspective, far from being typical
among contemporary writers, was almost unique. Even when writers like Daniel
Defoe and Samuel Johnson emphasized the rights of authors and called for stronger
copyright protection, they did not present a more robust property right as the only
means, or even the primary means, of achieving these goals. In what follows, I
canvass the array of perspectives that eighteenth-century writers presented, both in
their comments on authorial ownership and in their practice.
A property-oriented view, in the analysis I present here, is one concerned with
threats of market rivalry—a view that eagerly discovers derivative uses, market
substitutes, and other forms of financial competition by texts that seem (in the eyes
of the copyright holder) to have been inspired by the author’s work. Someone who
thinks about authors’ rights in financial terms might also have other reasons, not
rooted in property rights, to object to imitations, sequels, and generically similar
works (they might be seen as insults to the author, for instance, having the potential
both to dilute the work’s value in the market and to damage the public’s opinion of
the author).

6. See id.; see also Simon Stern, Copyright, Originality, and the Public Domain in Eighteenth-Century
England, in ORIGINALITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH
ENLIGHTENMENT 69 (Reginald McGinnis ed., 2008).
7. Tonson v. Collins (1761) 96 Eng. Rep. 169; 1 Black W. 301; Tonson v. Collins (1761) 96
Eng. Rep. 180; 1 Black W. 321.
8. Millar v. Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201; 4 Burr. 2303.
9. Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837; 4 Burr. 2408.
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Again, a writer who is primarily concerned with reputational matters might be
disturbed by unauthorized reprints, while remaining indifferent to other works that
use generically similar features—or might even be flattered by them. One who is
concerned with property rights, on the other hand, would be readier to highlight
the derivative status of these writings, and to insist that the derivative works’ success
should be attributed to the source that inspired them. Some eighteenth-century
writers were openly critical of such views, whereas others had little to say about
perceptions of market competition, while showing more interest in other aspects of
literary commerce, such as the right not to have others’ work “fathered” on them
(i.e., not to be named as the author of work they did not write).10
More generally, despite the popularity of plagiarism-hunting among
eighteenth-century writers and critics, it is striking that charges of plagiarism were
rarely articulated in terms of property. The significant absence of property-based
complaints from contemporaneous accusations of plagiarism has largely escaped
notice, because the metaphor of “theft,” which often accompanies these
accusations, is often assumed to carry with it the logic of property rights. Even if
the Statute of Anne applied only to the unauthorized copying of an entire work (as
a commentator noted in 1767, most writers “never stole any thing except lines and
sentences, which by the bye is not made penal”11), a property-based view of
copyright would tend to treat plagiarism, by extension, in the same terms—as a
similarly larcenous violation whose kinship to piracy is perfectly obvious, whether
or not the law is prepared to police it. Eighteenth-century writers were not averse
to characterizing plagiarism as “theft,” but these complaints nevertheless tended to
emphasize that the conduct was an offense to propriety and decency. Given the
seemingly inviting implication that the plagiarist was morally, if not legally, indebted
to the original author, and should be obliged to account for the illicit profits, it is
notable how rarely accusations of plagiarism pursued this theme, and how often
writers who claimed to have been plagiarized were content simply to point out the
similarities and to insist on the feebleness of the copy, rather than to demand
restitution.
I. PROPERTY TALK, PROPERTY RULES, AND THE STATUTE OF ANNE
One of the most frequently cited grounds for contending that copyright was
always a property right, from the time of its statutory origins, involves the use of
the term property in the second clause of the Statute of Anne. This was, indeed, a

10. See, e.g., infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
11. ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL, THE SALE OF AUTHORS, A DIALOGUE, IN IMITATION
OF LUCIAN’S SALE OF PHILOSOPHERS 5 (London, Booksellers in London and Westminster
1767). Similarly, Arthur Murphy, a playwright and a barrister, found himself unable to decide about the
permissibility of the “Kind of Imitation . . . which consists in adopting the Sentiments and Phrases of
others,” concluding that its “Legality is yet a Question.” ARTHUR MURPHY, No. 16: On Imitation in
Writing, GRAY’S-INN JOURNAL (Feb. 3, 1752), reprinted in 1 THE GRAY’S-INN JOURNAL 105, 107
(London, W. Faden for P. Vaillant 1756).
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point that the booksellers themselves never tired of repeating in their pamphlets
and legal arguments concerning the nature of copyright, but on scrutiny, it proves
to be remarkably weak. Scholars have shown that despite the property-laden
rhetoric that saturated the original draft of the statute, which used language
suggested by members of the bookselling industry,12 nearly all of this language was
excised as the draft proceeded through Parliament.13 The term had originally
appeared in the preamble, explaining that “the undoubted Property of . . . Books
and Writings” had once been safe, but that “Notorious Invasion[s] of the Property”
in recent years, by way of unauthorized publication, had threatened its security,
necessitating statutory protection “for the Preservation of the Property of the
Rightful Owner thereof.”14 By the time the bill passed into law, however, the only
remaining vestige of “property talk” appears in the provision related to the
registration scheme, designed to give notice to others that a particular title was
already taken: to ensure that no one violated the statute “through ignorance” of
another’s claim, it was thought desirable that “some provision [should] be made,
whereby the property in every . . . book . . . may be ascertained.”15
While the existence of this provision has often been noted (not least by the
booksellers’ lawyers, as they litigated the statute’s meaning over the next six
decades), the significance of its placement has received less attention. It is hardly
plausible that, having excised the many references to property in the section where
this term was used to introduce and justify the need for protection, and to
demonstrate its basis, the drafters would have sought to convey the very same point
by using the term in a subordinate clause in a provision concerning registration. The
more plausible conclusion is that the drafters simply overlooked this instance, which
managed to avoid the red pen precisely because it was buried in a seemingly
12. Commenting cynically on the booksellers’ motives, many decades later, Sir John Dalrymple
remarked that “the Stationers Company, conscious that no [common-law property right] existed, took
especial care in all their bye law and resolves, to introduce the words PROPERTY and PROPRIETORS
as frequently as possible . . . .” MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, Feb. 11, 1774, at
3. Another critic observed that, even if taken at face value, the booksellers’ petition insisting on the
need for statutory protection “does not allege, that, at common Law, [anyone] had any Right of
Property; but only sets forth, that there had been a constant Usage of selling Books, to be held as a
Property; which is a plain Acknowledgment by the Petitioners themselves, that there was here no real
Right of Property, but only something which they had been pleased to view as a Sort of Property, or
compare to a real Property. But the Subsumption immediately infers from this, that they actually had a
real Property . . . which, however artful, is plainly inconsistent and inconclusive.” JOHN MACLAURIN
DREGHORN, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF LITERARY PROPERTY: WHEREIN
THAT SPECIES OF PROPERTY IS CLEARLY PROVED TO SUBSIST NO LONGER THAN FOR THE TERMS
FIXED BY THE STATUTE 8VO ANNE 7 (Edinburgh, Alexander Donaldson 1767).
13. On the excision of this language, see, for example, ROSE, supra note 3, at 45; John Feather,
The Book Trade in Politics: The Making of the Copyright Act of 1710, 8 PUB. HIST. 19 (1980); Stern,
supra note 4, at 45–47.
14. In addition to the sources cited supra note 13, see Ronan Deazley, Commentary on the Statute
of Anne 1710, PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900), http://www.copyrighthistory.org/
cam/commentary/uk_1710/uk_1710_com_272007105424.html [ https://perma.cc/QE6M-JNN4]
( last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
15. Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 2 (Gr. Brit.).
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insignificant place. This era is not renowned for care, precision, and thoroughness
in statutory drafting, and the Statute of Anne has been characterized as a particularly
telling example of these deficiencies.16 That the word property appears in this niche,
then, testifies more to the determination (and good fortune) of the booksellers who
worked so energetically to specify an appealing legal framework for the protection
they sought, than to the goals of the legislators who seem to have been doubtful, at
best, about the desirability of adopting that framework.
Nor was this the first time the booksellers had managed to transform their
assertions about the property-like nature of printing rights into an (apparently)
officially accepted view. As Peter Blayney has noted, the Stationers’ Company, the
London guild of printers and booksellers, had long been given to mythologizing
about the origins of printing rights, with an eye towards protecting the profits
flowing from their publications. As Blayney explains, royal printing privileges, by
which the Crown gave the holder of the privilege (the patentee) exclusive rights
over a particular title or class of titles, were characterized by guild members, in the
seventeenth century, as a kind of feudal property right, akin to the right of tenure
in real property (with the implication that the right to print a certain title or class of
books amounted to the same thing as fee simple).17 According to this view, all
printing rights originated with the Crown (just as all real property did), and thus, the
grant of a privilege amounted to the transfer of the Crown’s property interest in the
publications that fell within the privilege.
Blayney notes that various scholars have accepted this myth, and in doing so,
[t]hey rely on . . . a myth deliberately invented . . . by the law-patentee and
liar, Richard Atkyns. To lay the spurious groundwork for a legal defence
of the patent his wife had inherited from her father, in 1660 Atkyns wrote
and published a fictitious “history” of how Henry VI, at great expense, had
brought printing to England in the 1450s by procuring the defection of
one of Gutenberg’s journeymen. Six years later his counsel used that
fiction in court to argue that because a king had first financed the
importation of the new invention, printing in England had always
“belonged” to the Crown. That finding was subsequently cited in a lawsuit
of 1677 by Sir Francis Pemberton, who argued that because the almanack
then in question had “no certain Author . . . according to the Rule of our

16. See C.K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 482 (7th ed. 1964) (remarking on a tendency, in
statutory language in this era, towards “verbosity which succeeded only in concealing the real matter of
the law under a welter of superfluous synonyms”); DEAZLEY, supra note 3, at 49 (discussing the statute’s
numerous deficiencies and noting that Daniel Defoe’s prescient complaint about “the miserable
Havock that is made in this Nation, . . . with Relation to Books,” although it appeared while the statute
was undergoing revision, might well be applied to the final product); Ian McLeod, Legislative Drafting,
in LEGAL METHOD 193, 193–94 (1993) (quoting and commenting on C.K. Allen’s observation about
verbosity in statutory language in this era).
17. 1 PETER W.M. BLAYNEY, THE STATIONERS’ COMPANY AND THE PRINTERS OF LONDON,
1501–1557, at 170–71 (2013) (citations omitted).
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Law, the King has the property, and by consequence may grant his
Property to the Company” of Stationers.18
Not only was this argument advanced by Pemberton, as counsel for the Stationers’
Company (the plaintiffs in the 1677 dispute in Company of Stationers v. Seymour), but
it was accepted by the court, which ruled that “there is no particular author of an
almanac; and then, by the rule of our law, the King has the property in the copy.”19
Blayney notes that the story of the Gutenberg defector is clearly anachronistic,
because it was not until Elizabeth’s reign, a century later, that the Crown began to
grant monopolies to “individuals who introduced new inventions into the realm,”20
and he adds that even if this invented history had been accurate, its logic would be
specious, because “the question of who had the right to use a printing press was (or
should have been) entirely separate from the question of who had the right to profit
from marketing printed copies of a particular text.”21 For present purposes,
Blayney’s observations are significant for two reasons: first, they help to remind us
once again of the booksellers’ zeal in manufacturing justifications that would
transform the conventions of the guild into property rights recognized at law; and
second, they show how much success these myths sometimes enjoyed, to the point
where a court swallowed the myth and the conclusions it supposedly justified.
Just as the placement of the term property in the second clause of the Statute
of Anne has generally been overlooked by those who take it as evidence of the legal
framework governing the statute as a whole, so the booksellers’ own concerns about
the statute’s approach to liability have also gone unnoticed. Most notably, the
booksellers sought a law that either would create a right against unauthorized
publication for a perpetual term, or, failing that, would say nothing about the term
of protection, leaving it implicit that the protection lasted forever.22 That hope was
shattered when the statute adopted a term of protection for fourteen years, with the
possibility of another fourteen years if the author was still alive at the end of the
first term.23 In addition, the booksellers had little enthusiasm for a regime that
imposed ex post monetary sanctions on violators. When this approach had been
proposed in 1697, in a piece of legislation that ultimately failed, the booksellers were
vehement in their criticism. They insisted that a penalty in the form of a fine,
imposed after a showing of infringement, would be ineffective:

18. Id.
19. Company of Stationers v. Seymour (1677) 86 Eng. Rep. 865, 866; 1 Mod. 257, 258. For a
recent discussion of this case, see H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Stationers v. Seymour (1677), in
LANDMARK CASES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 21 ( Jose Bellido ed., 2017).
20. BLAYNEY, supra note 17, at 171 n.8 (quoting J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY 377 (2d ed. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id. at 171 (emphasis added).
22. Stern, supra note 4, at 39–41. They claimed that the guild convention had always been to
confer perpetual publication rights for each title that a member registered, but again, as Blayney has
shown, this convention began in the early seventeenth century. See BLAYNEY, supra note 17, at 171.
23. Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (Gr. Brit.). On the introduction of this provision,
and the booksellers’ reaction to it while the legislation was pending, see Stern, supra note 4, at 47–52.
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[T]hose that will Invade their [i.e., the booksellers’] Rights, may wage Law
with them out of the profits of their Own Books so pyrated upon them;
and though [the violators] should lose the Cause, yet may be considerable
Gainers by the Bargain, whilst in the meantime the Proprietor may be
ruin’d; it being no easy matter for him to prove out of a stol’n Impression
of a Thousand Books . . . that One hundred of them have been sold;
and . . . even Then they cannot expect suitable Costs and Damages.24
In short, the booksellers argued, a fine would be cumbersome, costly, and
ineffective; it would come too late and would inevitably undercompensate them
both for the injury itself and for the cost of litigation. What the booksellers wanted
was not a liability rule but a property rule.25
Even the authors who were sympathetic to the booksellers’ position evidently
did not understand this demand. Daniel Defoe, who energetically supported the
booksellers’ cause, drafted a proposed bill just days before the new legislation was
formally proposed in parliament. (This effort puts him in the same company with
Ezra Pound as one of the few writers actually to try his hand at copyright
legislation.26) Defoe explained that “[piracy] and the Printing seditious or heretical
Books, is easily suppress’d by an Act of Parliament”; according to his proposal,
no Man shall presume to print, or sell when printed, any Book that has
been printed before, without the Consent or Agreement of the Author or
Proprietor of the said Book—under a Penalty of 5 l. per Sheet for the said
Copy, to be paid Half to the Queen, Half to the Person injur’d, by the
Printer or Publisher of the said Book . . . [and] the Author or Proprietor of
any Copy so pyrated, shall have his private Action of Damages against
every Seller or Publisher of such Copy, as well as against the Printer;
wherein if he cast the said Publisher, he shall recover for every Book so
vended or sold by them, 5 l. with treble Costs.27
Thus, Defoe would have imposed a damages regime on piracies—just as the enacted
legislation did. The key difference is that Defoe proposed a penalty of five pounds
per sheet of pirated text, whereas the Statute of Anne provided only for one penny
per sheet.
Yet if the fine provided in the statute seemed insultingly low, and seemed to
confirm the booksellers’ worst fears about the uselessness of a liability rule, the very
fact of its inclusion proved to be sufficient for their purposes. The statute’s
provisions allowed for both “Actions [and] Suits”—the former being the mode of

24. DEAZLEY, supra note 3, at 41 (quoting REASONS HUMBLY OFFER’D TO THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE HONOURABLE HOUSE OF COMMONS, SHEWING THE GREAT NECESSITY
OF HAVING A BILL FOR THE REGULATING OF PRINTING AND PRINTING-PRESSES (1697)).
25. For the classic articulation of this distinction, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1972).
26. Robert Spoo, Ezra Pound’s Copyright Statute: Perpetual Rights and the Problem of Heirs, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1775 (2009).
27. Daniel Defoe, Miscellanea, 6 REV. ST. BRITISH NATION (Dec. 6, 1709) (Gr. Brit.).
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proceeding in a court of law, and the latter in a court of equity. It took the
booksellers little time to realize that they could use the legal remedy as a basis for
seeking injunctive relief.28 Courts of equity granted a preliminary injunction on a
showing of likelihood of infringement, and in that context, the use of the legal
penalty was not that it furnished the remedy (since an equitable court could not
grant money damages), but rather that it established the basis for the plaintiff’s claim
to some kind of relief—including the injunctive relief available in equity. Often, a
preliminary injunction, granted on an ex parte basis, was sufficient for the
booksellers’ purposes, and if the defendant did not appear to contest the injunction,
it could be extended.29 By this means, they converted the liability rule into a property
rule. To be sure, that is not a name that would have been used, at this time, for the
booksellers’ solution. Nevertheless, the result, over the following decades, was that
they could claim to find protection for property rights in the language of the statute,
and could derive from the statute’s penalties clause a means of proceeding against
alleged infringers by seeking an injunction rather than suing for the trifling amount
of damages provided there. From what some might regard as a very unpromising
source, the booksellers managed to extract a property right.
There is yet a further implication to be derived from the details we have
observed thus far—namely, that when we encounter the word property, or propertybased justifications, in older sources, we must consider the historical context, rather
than concluding that the word’s mere presence demonstrates that contemporaries
generally would have adopted the legal framework that the term seems to import.
Once we return to the language in the original version of the Statute of Anne, the
term’s placement in the final version tends to undermine the significance that
commentators usually assign to it. Once we read the arguments in Company of
Stationers v. Seymour in light the backstory that Blayney adumbrates, we have reason
to doubt the often-repeated myth about the origins of the royal printing prerogative,
and the feudal story of property rights that goes with it.30
These may seem obvious points, hardly worth elaborating, but historical
sources are sometimes harder to interpret than they may at first appear. Thus, for
instance, one commentator, in a discussion of the eighteenth-century sources,
observes that “[b]y 1743, the King’s Bench court would state without controversy
that the Statute of Anne protected ‘[l]iterary property.’”31 The support for this claim

28. See DEAZLEY, supra note 3, at 51–65; H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, The Untold Story of the
First Copyright Suit Under the Statute of Anne in 1710, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247 (2010); Simon
Stern, Creating a Public Domain in Eighteenth-Century England, OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE
(Aug. 2015), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935338.001.0001/
oxfordhb-9780199935338-e-39 [ https://perma.cc/M2HD-ZSK8].
29. In some instances, these injunctions were described as “perpetual”; whether they actually
amounted to a perpetual injunction, today generally considered to be a form of relief rather than
procedural measure, remains open to question. See DEAZLEY, supra note 3, at 63–65.
30. For evidence that the story is indeed often repeated, see BLAYNEY, supra note 17, at 171.
31. Hughes, supra note 2, at 1016 (citation omitted).
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proves to come from the second round of litigation in Tonson v. Collins.32 However,
the quoted language comes from a footnote in the English Reports, an early
twentieth-century compilation of older, nominate English law reports.33 That
footnote was added by the editors of the English Reports, as becomes evident after
a look at the original report of the case, in William Blackstone’s posthumously
published Reports.34 What appears on its face to be the court’s language thus turns
out, on inspection, to form no part of the original judgment, but rather to be a
modern addition.35
For another illustration, consider the assertion by the Supreme Court, in
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures,36 that “[b]y the middle of the 17th century, the common
law recognized an author’s right to prevent the unauthorized publication of his
manuscript,” and that this right “derived from the principle that the manuscript was
the product of intellectual labor and was as much the author’s property as the
material on which it was written.”37 These twinned propositions are said to find
support, respectively, in Stationers Co. v. Patentees (1666) and Millar v. Taylor (1769).38
First, a proposition dated to the mid-seventeenth-century can hardly be
substantiated by Millar, a decision rendered a century later. Second, the theory of
property summarized here finds its source in John Locke’s Two Treatises of
Government, published more than twenty years after the first of these cases.39 Finally,
one must wonder how a dispute among members of the printing trade—namely,
the Stationers’ Company and the patentees claiming the rights to print Henry Rolle’s
Un Abridgment des Plusieurs Cases et Resolutions del Common Ley40 (pursuant to a

32. Id. at 1016 n.95 (citing Tonson v. Collins (1761) 96 Eng. Rep. 180, 192; 1 Black W. 321, 345).
33. The English Reports were published in 1900–32; for some observations about the features
that distinguish them from the nominate reports they collect, see Byron D. Cooper, Anglo-American
Legal Citation: Historical Development and Library Implications, 75 LAW LIBR. J. 3, 15, 29 (1982).
34. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN THE SEVERAL
COURTS OF WESTMINSTER-HALL, FROM 1746 TO 1779, at 321, 345 (1781). For further discussion of
the significance of the Tonson litigation in relation to Blackstone’s views on copyright law, see Simon
Stern, Introduction to 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, at xvii
(Simon Stern ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (1766). Indeed, Hughes notes, when discussing this
footnote, that it displays “a particularity,” because the same sentence refers to an “amendment of the
Statute of Anne in 1814.” Hughes, supra note 2, at 1016 n.95 (citation omitted). But although a reference
to a provision adopted in 1814 would suggest that the sentence could not have been written in the mideighteenth century, he does not go on to draw that conclusion.
35. This is not to dispute that the phrase literary property appeared in eighteenth-century sources;
it appeared often—precisely because the booksellers invoked it repeatedly during their efforts to secure
perpetual copyright.
36. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998). Thanks to Zahr Said for
pointing me to this example.
37. Id. at 349 (citing Stationers Co. v. Patentees (1666) 124 Eng. Rep. 842; Carter 89; Millar
v. Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 252; 4 Burr. 2303, 2398.
38. Id.
39. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1690). For citation to Locke in Millar,
see 98 Eng. Rep. at 220; 4 Burr. at 2339 (argument of William Blackstone).
40. HENRY ROLLE, UN ABRIDGMENT DES PLUSIEURS CASES ET RESOLUTIONS DEL
COMMON LEY (London, A. Crooke et al. 1668).
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privilege issued by the Crown)—could be said to turn on questions about the
author’s rights over a manuscript, and indeed, there is no mention of this point
anywhere in Stationers v. Patentees.41 To be sure, Lord Mansfield, in Millar, offered
a justification along those lines, but not in relation to the dispute over Rolle’s
Abridgment.42 The arguments about property rights and the invocation of Millar
turn out, on inspection, to derive from the petitioner’s brief (whose lead author was
John Roberts, then a partner at Hogan & Hartson);43 how the case of Stationers
Co. v. Patentees entered into the analysis remains unclear.
Again, the opacity of historical sources, particularly those dating from before
the early twentieth century, can easily lead to misinterpretations unless one examines
the original sources and asks not just what words appear in the text, but who is
advancing a given proposition, and what it means, in the context of the litigation
and the resulting decision. The problem is hardly unique to historical disputes about
the status of property, but it is especially likely to arise in that context, in part
perhaps because the term’s meaning may appear to be self-explanatory.
II. EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY WRITERS AND THE LANGUAGE OF PROPERTY
As noted above, the bookselling industry furnished an excellent source of
arguments about the property-based nature of copyright during this period—but
what if we turn to contemporaneous writers? A wide array of perspectives comes
into view, but notably, those who laid great emphasis on property rights tended to
be affiliated with the printing industry in some way. Thus, for instance, Samuel
Richardson, a printer by trade, was particularly vociferous in attacking all forms of
literary copying, whether it involved reprinting his novels without authorization or
imitating them without authorization. Other writers, like Jonathan Swift and
Alexander Pope, sometimes adopted the idiom of property, using this language to
convey a subtler conception of ownership and use than one that equates property
with chattels. Others again, like Henry Fielding, rarely invoked a conception of
literature as property except as a means of mockery.
Alexander Pope offers a useful example of a writer who was fully capable of
perceiving and exploiting the potential of copyright as a form of property, but

41. The dispute turned not on which of the parties had obtained Rolle’s permission to print the
book, but on the validity of a patent (or privilege) issued by the Crown, relating to “all Law-Books that
concern the Common Law.” 124 Eng. Rep. at 842; Carter at 89. The same Richard Atkins (or Atkyns)
whom Blayney discusses was a party in the dispute. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
42. Mansfield’s only reference to that dispute appears in Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 254; 4 Burr. at
2401. In the same decision, Mansfield repeats the claim that printing was introduced in England around
the time of Henry VI. See 98 Eng. Rep. at 252; 4 Burr. at 2398; supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Burrow himself, however, corrects that story in a “Memorandum” he added at the end. See 98
Eng. Rep. at 262–66; 4 Burr. at 2418–18.
43. See Brief for Petitioner at 25, & n.12, Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523
U.S. 340 (1998) (No. 96-1768) (citing Millar for the proposition that “[t]he early common law right was
derived from concepts of natural law—recognizing the fruits of one’s intellectual labor as his
property.”).
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whose views on literary commerce were not restricted to this perspective. Because
Pope was one of the best-known poets of his age, it is tempting to draw on his
statements about violations of his property as evidence that this was the dominant
view, shared by writers and booksellers alike. The temptation should be resisted,
because his strategic invocations of this language occurred amidst various other
ways of engaging with these questions.
One of the earliest uses of the term “copyright” (by someone other than a
bookseller) appears in a letter from Pope to John Gay, written in 1732, concerning
the Dublin bookseller Benjamin Motte. Pope writes,
Motte and another idle fellow, I find, have been writing to the Dean [i.e.,
Swift], to get him to give them some copy-right, which surely he will be
not so indiscreet as to do . . . . Surely I should be a properer person to trust
the distribution of his works with, than so common a bookseller. Here will
be nothing but the ludicrous and little things; none of the political, or any
things of consequence . . . . [I]t would be silly in him to give a copy-right
to any, which can only put the manner of publishing [his writings] hereafter
out of his own and his friend’s power into that of mercenaries.44
These comments may have room for a conception of copyright as a kind of chattel,
but their primary thrust involves Swift’s relation to his readers, as manifested by the
mode of publication: Pope, rather than Motte, is more properly entrusted with
control over the “distribution of [Swift’s] works” and the “manner of publishing,”
because Pope knows which works would best represent Swift to the readership he
seeks.45 In these lines, decisions about what to print and how to print are bound up
with reputational concerns, as Pope shows in his disparaging remarks about Motte
as a “common bookseller” with mercenary motives, whose productions would not
be a credit to the author. Pope is “properer” because of his concern about which
works to select and how to present them; he will be careful to include the “things
44. Pope’s letter has not survived, but is quoted in a letter from Gay to Jonathan Swift, dated
August 28, 1732. 3 LETTERS, WRITTEN BY JONATHAN SWIFT, D. D. DEAN OF ST. PATRICK’S,
DUBLIN, AND SEVERAL OF HIS FRIENDS 82 ( John Hawkesworth ed., London, T. Davies et al. 5th
ed. 1767). The result of Swift’s interactions with Motte was 3 MISCELLANIES (London, Motte &
Bathurst 1736). The context of Pope’s letter and its aftermath are most usefully explained in 3 IRVIN
EHRENPREIS, SWIFT: THE MAN, HIS WORKS, AND THE AGE 746–48 (1983), where the other “idle
fellow” (besides Motte) is identified as the bookseller Abel Bowyer. The letter is also discussed in
DAVID FOXON, POPE AND THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BOOK TRADE 224 ( James
McLaverty ed., 1991); ROSE, supra note 3, at 58 n.4; Donald W. Nichol, On the Use of ‘Copy’ and
‘Copyright’: A Scriblerian Coinage?, 12 LIBRARY 110, 114–15 (1990).
45. On Swift’s maneuverings over the authorized and unauthorized publication of his works
more generally, see STEPHEN KARIAN, JONATHAN SWIFT IN PRINT AND MANUSCRIPT passim (2010);
Sean D. Moore, Banking on Print: The Bank of Ireland, the South Sea Bubble, and the Bailout, in SWIFT,
THE BOOK, AND THE IRISH FINANCIAL REVOLUTION (2010); Ian Gadd, Leaving the Printer to His
Liberty: Swift and the London Book Trade, 1701–1714, in JONATHAN SWIFT AND THE EIGHTEENTHCENTURY BOOK 51 (Paddy Bullard & James McLaverty eds., 2013); Ian Higgins, Censorship, Libel, and
Self-Censorship, in JONATHAN SWIFT AND THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BOOK, supra note 45, at 179;
Stephen Karian, Swift as a Manuscript Poet, in JONATHAN SWIFT AND THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
BOOK, supra note 45, at 31; Andrew Bricker, Libel and Lampoon: Satire in the Courts, 1670–1792
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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of consequence” rather than degrading Swift’s name by trafficking in “the ludicrous
and little things.” Ceding control to these “idle fellow[s]” would be “indiscreet.”
As it happens, Swift was indiscreet enough to let Motte publish the book, and
the result fully justified Pope’s concerns. In a letter to Motte, Swift regretted his
own inattentiveness to Pope’s advice. Swift complained that he had not expected to
find some long-forgotten “humorous or satirical trifles” in the volume; that the
volume erroneously credited him with material by others (“[T]he greatest part of
the prose was written by other persons . . . as well as myself”); and that, worst of
all, Motte had included some pieces whose authorship Swift had managed to
disclaim up until then:
I have writ some things that would make people angry. I always sent them
by unknown hands; the printer might guess, but he could not accuse me;
he ran the whole risk, and well deserved the property, if he could carry it
to London and print it there, but I am sure I could have no property at
all.46
The harms that Swift enumerates have to do with his name and dignity. His
forgotten indiscretions have been revived, and he has had others’ works foisted on
him. (He added, a month later, that the printing was “very incorrect.”47) He
disavows any property in his anonymous writings, even after Motte’s publication
has brought them back to him. By saying that the printer “deserved the property,”
Swift evidently refers to the income: whoever risked publishing these works was
entitled to any profits they generated. From this, it would follow that any and all
who were willing to take that risk deserved the same reward, and hence that they
were equally entitled to profits in a work in which none of them could hold
exclusive property. By the final phrase (“I could have no property at all”) Swift
evidently means that, having never sought to acknowledge the work, he does not
believe it is up to him to give anyone the right to print it, or to restrain them from
printing it, nor may he partake of the profits.48
Of course, Swift’s desire to separate himself completely from his anonymous
writings helps to explain his posture, which appears strange from the perspective of
a property-oriented copyright regime. This is not a case of an author who welcomes
46. EHRENPREIS, supra note 44, at 748 (letter from Jonathan Swift to Benjamin Motte,
November 4, 1732). On this letter, see also Karian, supra note 45, at 42; Adam Rounce, Swift’s Texts
Between Dublin and London, in JONATHAN SWIFT AND THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BOOK, supra note
45, at 199, 204; Bricker, supra note 45.
47. Letter from Jonathan Swift to Benjamin Motte (Dec. 9, 1732), in 4 THE CORRESPONDENCE
OF JONATHAN SWIFT 89, 89–90 (Harold Williams ed., 1965).
48. Ehrenpreis writes that “‘Property’ here means copyright . . . .” EHRENPREIS, supra note 44,
at 748 n.1. That appears to be Swift’s meaning in the second instance, but not in the reference to the
printer who “deserved the property.” In other correspondence, Swift complained about the lack of
“property among Printers” and of “Propriety of Copyes” in Ireland; after quoting these remarks,
Stephen Karian concludes that “Swift could neither sign over publication rights to a bookseller nor
order a bookseller not to print his works because, in the absence of copyright protection, he did not
own the rights to those works . . . .” KARIAN, supra note 45, at 27. The same could be said about Swift’s
disavowal of property in the letter to Motte.
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the attribution but is disinclined to see the text as a form of property. In this
instance, and in many others, Swift would have preferred to do without the
attribution as well; his reasons, as Stephen Karian notes, included “a gentlemanly
disdain for the fame created by print publication, a natural love of games and
deception, and protection from scandal or prosecution in the case of controversial
writings.”49 However, even after his cover has been blown and he has unwillingly
been made to own up to these writings (vitiating his reputational interest in nonattribution), Swift nevertheless disavows any property interest. He distinguishes
between the two, and disclaims the property even after being forced to accept the
attribution.
Swift’s attitude is the opposite of the one contemplated just a few years later,
in the legislation proposed (but not adopted) in 1737, which made special provisions
for authors to retain copyright in anonymous and pseudonymous works.50 Another
part of the same bill—sometimes attributed to Swift—would have revised the
reversion scheme to provide for repeated ten-year periods of protection, each
followed by reversion to the author, continuing until eleven years after the author’s
death.51 The attribution to Swift remains speculative, but it reminds us that what
may seem, from one perspective, to reflect a concern for the author’s property right,
might be used by others for reputational ends. Swift might well have disdained any
measures to control the publication or profits of his anonymous writings, even if
there were express provisions to allow for such control, while using a more
favorable reversion arrangement to monitor the selection and correctness of those
writings he cared to take credit for.
Though Pope was notoriously vigilant in maintaining control over his writings
and in policing others’ use of them in the literary marketplace, like Swift, he was
also capable of dwelling on reputational grievances in his complaints about
unauthorized printing. On several occasions he went to great pains (using an
elaborate subterfuge) to arrange for the unauthorized publication of his own letters
49. KARIAN, supra note 45, at 16.
50. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by the More Effectual Securing the Sole Right of
Printing Books to the Authors thereof . . . during the Times therein Mentioned, (Draft), London (1737),
PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900), http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/
request/showRecord.php?id=record_uk_1737b [ https://perma.cc/W4DR-TXZH] ( last visited
Jan. 20, 2019). The legislation is discussed at greater length in Simon Stern, Speech and Property in David
Simple, 79 ELH 623, 629–32 (2012).
51. See M. POLLARD, DUBLIN’S TRADE IN BOOKS 1550–1800: LYELL LECTURES, 1986–1987,
at 70–71 (1989); Donald Cornu, Swift, Motte, and the Copyright Struggle: Two Unnoticed Documents, 54
MOD. LANGUAGE NOTES 114, 121–23 (1939); see also DEAZLEY, supra note 3, at 104–08 (noting that
Swift had taken an interest in efforts to amend the Statute of Anne in 1735); Ronan
Deazley, Commentary on: Booksellers’ Bill (1737), PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–
1900), http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_uk_1737
[ https://perma.cc/U4GT-SXX9] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019). Swift has been credited with devising this
clause on the basis of a notation in a contemporary copy of the draft legislation, labeling this provision
“Dean Swift’s Clause.” See Cornu, supra note 51, at 122; see also REPORT ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF
EARL BATHURST: PRESERVED AT CIRENCESTER PARK 10–11 (1923). Although no other sources
corroborate this attribution, some scholars have credited it. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 45, at 179, 181.
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by his arch-enemy, the publisher Edmund Curll. On one of these occasions, in 1737,
Pope awaited the book’s publication and then, rather than harping on the property
offense, objected in terms that sound like a repeat of Swift’s letter to Motte: because
of Curll’s illicit conduct, Pope complained, he had been deprived of “the power of
rejecting, and the right judging . . . what pieces it may be most useful, entertaining,
or reputable to publish, at the time and in the manner [he thought] best,” and “of
the right even over [his] own Sentiments, of the privilege of every human creature
to divulge or conceal them.”52 The burden of this argument does not involve the
misappropriation of the letters, or the profits accruing from their publication;
rather, Pope dwells on the harm to his name and the impairment of his ability to
decide what to print, and what to leave in manuscript. By highlighting the issue of
control over his ability to “divulge or conceal” his sentiments, Pope seems to
anticipate the privacy theory of Warren and Brandeis—a theory that emphatically
rejects a property-based justification in order to stress the need to protect personal
rights.53
Pope’s views on literary imitation, similarly, could accommodate a register that
was not defined by property rights, but instead allowed for what he called “a mutual
commerce” in which poets were free to recycle each other’s images and ideas. In
1706, in a letter to the poet William Walsh on the permissibility of borrowing, Pope
offers his own justification in a passage that anticipates his couplet in An Essay on
Criticism (1711) about common knowledge transposed into the elegant cadences
of the consummate stylist (“True Wit is Nature to Advantage drest, / What oft was
Thought, but ne’er so well Exprest”).54 Pope writes,
I wou’d beg your opinion . . . [as to] how far the liberty of Borrowing may
extend? I have defended it sometimes by saying that it seems not so much
the Perfection of Sense, to say things that have never been said before, as
to express those best that have been said oftenest, and that Writers in the
case of borrowing from others, are like Trees which of themselves wou’d
produce only one sort of Fruit, but by being grafted upon others, may yield
variety. A mutual commerce makes Poetry flourish; but then Poets like

52. LETTERS OF MR. ALEXANDER POPE, AND SEVERAL OF HIS FRIENDS, at sig. 5v (London,
J. Wright et al. 1737). For more on this episode, see PAUL BAINES & PAT ROGERS, EDMUND CURLL,
BOOKSELLER 268 (2007); MAYNARD MACK, ALEXANDER POPE: A LIFE 654 (1985); HARRY
M. SOLOMON, THE RISE OF ROBERT DODSLEY: CREATING THE NEW AGE OF PRINT 47–48 (1996);
2 THE MAJOR WORKS, 1725–1744, THE PROSE WORKS OF ALEXANDER POPE 341, 345–46
(Rosemary Cowler ed., 1986).
53. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890); for their treatment of various copyright decisions as anticipating the right they limn, see id. at
201–04.
54. Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, in THE POEMS OF ALEXANDER POPE 143, 153
( John Butt ed., 1963).

First to Printer_Stern (Do Not Delete)

476

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

1/28/2019 9:06 AM

[ Vol. 9:461

Merchants, shou’d repay with something of their own what they take from
others; not like Pyrates, make prize of all they meet.55
Pope imagines a literary orchard whose variety guarantees that authors will always
have more fruit to pluck, more produce to cultivate, so long as they continue to
intermix their stock. At first, he contemplates a landscape devastated
by “Pyrates,” whose ravages would ruin the victims and destroy the orchard
according to the metaphor of “theft.” However, instead of assuming that literary
borrowing necessarily leads to a tragedy of the commons, Pope then re-imagines it
as a comedy: he dwells on the growth economy fueled by tradesman-poets whose
“mutual commerce” not only recirculates but also multiplies their resources. Rather
than insisting that copying inevitably results in impoverishment, Pope suggests that
poets might opt for recompense instead of theft. The vocabulary of mutual
exchange and repayment, of course, can hardly betoken a process of direct, one-toone reciprocation between individual writers; rather, Pope seems to imagine a
common literary fund open to all applicants on the condition that they respond in
turn with their own contributions.
This account of poetic engraftment may seem hard to reconcile with the zeal
that Pope would later display when enforcing his right to control the publication of
his works. These two aspects of his authorial persona appear incongruent, however,
only if we assume that strong copyright protection necessitates a fully propertized
understanding of the literary work in all respects—that is, a view in which the
properties encompassed by the work include all of its components, such as plot and
character. If copyright is instead taken to extend only to unauthorized reprints, as
the Statute of Anne provided, then imitative practices are entirely permissible. Other
poets’ imitations of Pope, or their efforts to rival Pope by imitating the same sources
he used, may be worthy of disdain because of their incompetence, but these writers
are not necessarily piratical invaders who simply “make prize of all they meet.” Pope
does not claim control over his writings because of his originality; rather, he relishes
the opportunity to compete with others, striving for true wit by expressing best what
others have said before. On this view, imitations are welcome, because they take up
a competitive challenge that Pope feels confident of winning, but that does not
appear worthwhile unless others join in the contest. Indeed, as Nick Groom notes,
“Pope’s own imitations can read like an anthology of poetic models: Horace,
Homer, and Virgil; Chaucer, Spenser and Shakespeare; Waller, Cowley, and
Dryden.”56
Nevertheless, when policing his statutory rights, Pope took a very strict view
of illicit reproduction. His lawsuits are well known and I will not reexamine them

55. Letter from Pope to Walsh ( July 2, 1706), in 1 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ALEXANDER
POPE 19–20 (George Sherburn ed., 1956). For a recent discussion, see RICHARD TERRY, THE
PLAGIARISM ALLEGATION IN ENGLISH LITERATURE FROM BUTLER TO STERNE 81 (2010).
56. Nick Groom, Unoriginal Genius: Plagiarism and the Construction of ‘Romantic’ Authorship,
in COPYRIGHT AND PIRACY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 271, 278 (Lionel Bently, Jennifer
Davis & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2010).
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here: they show that he was prepared to enforce a right against unauthorized
publication—that is, against booksellers whose editions would have competed with
his and thus are easily understood as threats to his property rights. Instead I will
consider an episode in which he went so far as to pillory (though not to sue) a poet
who had misappropriated six lines from one of Pope’s unpublished poems. James
Moore Smythe had obtained permission from Pope to use the verses in a play called
The Rival Modes (1727).57 Pope later withdrew his permission, but Moore-Smythe
included the extract anyway, rendering it in italics (the contemporary equivalent of
quotation marks).58 Pope used the lines himself in his verses to Martha Blount “Sent
on Her Birth-Day” (1728) (and again in his “Epistle to a Lady” (1735).59 However,
he was not content simply to take back his own: in the footnotes to the Dunciad
(1729), Pope also criticized Moore-Smythe as a “Plagiary.”60 Perhaps he was
concerned that otherwise, readers might believe that he, rather than Moore-Smythe,
was the plagiarist. Pope writes that the
case . . . was like that of a man . . . who, as he was sitting in company,
perceived his next neighbour has stolen his handkerchief. ‘Sir (said the
thief, finding himself detected) ‘do not expose me, I did it for mere want;
be so good but to take it privately out of my pocket again, and say nothing.’
The honest man did so, but the other cry’d out, ‘See, gentlemen, what a
thief we have among us! look, he is stealing my handkerchief!’61
Some considered Pope’s response an example of proprietary overreaching.62
Nevertheless, it is not simply a story of theft and repossession: the thief’s
unexpected ploy, if deceitful, is also comic. Similarly, the comparison between the
literary theft and the theft of a handkerchief places the whole episode in a farcical
register that makes the offense seem petty rather than disgraceful. To say that Pope
casts the plagiarism as a property offense would be too simple: while doing so, he
also renders the event in comic terms that emphasize its absurdity.
Around the middle of the century, William Warburton and Samuel Richardson
took up the question of copyright protection, advancing its implications far beyond the
limits that the booksellers were claiming. These two writers were perhaps the most
enthusiastic contemporary proponents of a view of copyright as property; notably, both
had affiliations that help to explain their proprietary zeal. By the time he published
Pamela in 1740, Richardson was already well established in his career as a printer, while
Warburton seems to have become interested in the issue of copyright because he
was Pope’s literary executor, and he approached the question of copyright, and its

57. TERRY, supra note 55, at 89; see also ALEXANDER POPE, THE DUNCIAD, IN FOUR BOOKS
54–55 ( Valerie Rumbold ed., Routledge 2014); PAT ROGERS, THE ALEXANDER POPE ENCYCLOPEDIA
200 (2004).
58. JAMES MOORE SMYTHE, THE RIVAL MODES 24–25 (Dublin, S. Powell et al. 1727).
59. POPE, supra note 57, at 55.
60. Id. at 152–53 & n.50.
61. POPE supra note 57, at 80. For a fuller discussion, see TERRY, supra note 55, at 88–89.
62. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
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associations, in the spirit of a manager dedicated to capitalizing on the assets in his
custody.63
Warburton was perhaps the first figure outside of the bookselling industry to
defend the doctrine of perpetual copyright when he published A Letter from an
Author . . . Concerning Literary Property in 1747.64 There he develops a Lockean
argument based on the author’s labor. When he came to publish his edition of Pope’s
posthumous Works in 1751, Warburton took a more aggressive stance, combining the
roles of editor and predator in a prefatory warning to the poet’s enemies: “Together
with his Works, he hath bequeathed me his dunces. So that as the property is transferred,
I could wish they would now let his memory alone.”65 Warburton imagines himself as
the inheritor, not only of Pope’s literary estate, but also of all the appurtenances, fixtures,
and paraphernalia that go with it—these assets helping, perhaps, to enhance the value
of the estate that made him “one of the richest landlords of literary property in the
century.”66 It remains unclear what exactly Warburton means to communicate by
issuing this threat to the enemies whom Pope had castigated in The Dunciad, but the
general sense appears to be that any challenge to Pope’s memory, or property, will meet
with swift punishment. Warburton thus adds, to the role of executor, something like
that of an executioner. Because of the relation he bore to Pope’s works, Warburton was
far more disposed to regard himself as an embattled defender of textual incursions, of
any kind, than most other writers would have been.
Equally significant is Richardson’s outraged response to the booksellers who
brought out an unauthorized sequel to Pamela in 1741. At a time when expansions of
others’ stories were commonplace, Richardson sees this “spurious Continuation” as an
infringement of “his Right to his own Plan,” and advertises that he was “actually
continuing the Work himself, from Materials, that, perhaps, but for such a notorious
Invasion of his Plan, he should not have published.”67 Richardson treats the novel’s

63. Donald W. Nichol, Warburton ( Not!) on Copyright: Clearing Up the Misattribution of An
Enquiry Into the Nature and Origin of Literary Property (1762), 19 J. EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
STUD. 171, 172 (1996).
64. WILLIAM WARBURTON, A LETTER FROM AN AUTHOR, TO A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT;
CONCERNING LITERARY PROPERTY 405 (R. Hurd ed., London, Cadell & Davies 1811) (1747).
65. William Warburton, Advertisement of Warburton to His Edition of Pope’s Works, 1751, in 1
THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER POPE, ESQ. xii (William Warburton ed., 1751).
66. Nichol, supra note 63, at 172.
67. Samuel Richardson, Advertisement, DAILY GAZETTEER (London), May 7, 1741 and May 30,
1741 (quoted in T.C. DUNCAN EAVES & BEN D. KIMPEL, SAMUEL RICHARDSON: A BIOGRAPHY 135, 137
(1971)). For other discussions of Richardson’s irate response to this perceived abuse of his characters and
ideas, see LISA MARUCA, THE WORK OF PRINT: AUTHORSHIP AND THE ENGLISH TEXT TRADES, 1660–
1760, at 138–40 (2008); NATASHA SIMONOVA, EARLY MODERN AUTHORSHIP AND PROSE
CONTINUATIONS: ADAPTATION AND OWNERSHIP FROM SIDNEY TO RICHARDSON 124, 124–59
(2015); Elizabeth F. Judge, Kidnapped and Counterfeit Characters: Eighteenth-Century Fan Fiction,
Copyright Law, and the Custody of Fictional Characters, in ORIGINALITY AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH ENLIGHTENMENT 36–41 (Reginald McGinnis ed., 2009);
Tom Keymer & Peter Sabor, Literary Property and the Trade in Continuations, in PAMELA IN THE
MARKETPLACE: LITERARY CONTROVERSY AND PRINT CULTURE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
BRITAIN AND IRELAND 50, 50–82 (2006).
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underlying conception as a material quantity, capable of dissipation and recovery. Once
“invaded” and seemingly diminished, his “Plan,” or plot, or conception, can only be
redeemed if the author himself recovers it. His perceptions, evidently, reflected his
experience as a printer, which made him unusually sensitive to the economics of the
publishing marketplace, and consequently to any apparent form of market rivalry.
This anxiety would resurface when Richardson’s third novel, The History of Sir
Charles Grandison (1753), was reprinted without authorization in Dublin, outside the
geographical bounds of the Statute of Anne. Styling himself “the Editor and Sole
Proprietor of this new Work (New in every sense of the Word),” Richardson decried
“the INVASION of his PROPERTY,” giving equal weight to every component of the
book: “[N]ever was Work more the Property of any Man, than this is his. The Copy
never was in any other Hand: He borrows not from any Author: The Paper, the
Printing, entirely at his own Expence.”68 Richardson stresses the enormity of the
theft by aligning the intellectual and material property as if both parts were equally
capable of depletion, as if meddling with the book’s plot constituted the same kind
of violation as reprinting it without authorization. Seeking to discredit the Dublin
booksellers for their “Attempt to possess themselves of [the author’s] whole
Property,”69 Richardson stresses the indivisible nature of the property in question.
The views of Warburton and Richardson stand in stark contrast to those of
Henry Fielding, who was flippant, if not derisive, about the property claims that he
understood other writers to be advancing. Fielding’s Tom Jones (1749), published
shortly after Warburton’s Essay and in the midst of a copyright dispute that included
Fielding’s previous novel, Joseph Andrews (1742), casts an equivocal eye on the idea
of copyright as property.70 From a pragmatic perspective, Fielding had good reasons
for adhering to a property-based view of copyright: he had been offered a large sum
for the copyright of Joseph Andrews and he looked forward to receiving even more
for Tom Jones. Whatever Fielding might have thought about the reputational benefits
of seeing his works published far and wide, even in unauthorized editions from
other publishers, he could not expect to enjoy a continuing profitable relationship
68. Richardson, supra note 67, at 2, 3. For other discussions of this episode, see JOHNS, supra
note 1, at 51–55; Daniel Cook, On Authorship, Appropriation, and Eighteenth-Century Fiction, in THE
AFTERLIVES OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FICTION 20, 25–26 (Daniel Cook & Nicholas Seager eds.,
2015); Judge, supra note 67, at 30; Donatella Montini, Owning the Text, Disowning the Hand: Sir Charles
Grandison, the Epistolary Novel, and Copyright, in THE ECONOMY PRINCIPLE IN ENGLISH:
LINGUISTIC, LITERARY, AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 376, 376–84 (Giovanni Iamartino et al. eds.,
2002); Simon Stern, The Law, in SAMUEL RICHARDSON IN CONTEXT 231, 231–38 (Peter Sabor &
Betty A. Schellenberg eds., 2017); see also SAMUEL RICHARDSON, CORRESPONDENCE PRIMARILY ON
SIR CHARLES GRANDISON (1750–1754) 101–29 (Betty A. Schellenberg ed., 2014).
69. Richardson, supra note 67, at 3.
70. HENRY FIELDING, TOM JONES 541 ( John Bender & Simon Stern eds., 1996). Joseph
Andrews was one of the publications in dispute in a long-running lawsuit between the London and
Edinburgh booksellers, Midwinter v. Hamilton, filed in 1743 and ending (inconclusively) in 1751. That
dispute has not received much attention from scholars; for some useful treatments, see Ronan Deazley,
The Myth of Copyright at Common Law, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 106 (2003); Hector MacQueen, The War of
the Booksellers: Natural Law, Equity, and Literary Property in Eighteenth-Century Scotland, 35 J. LEGAL
HIST. 231 (2014).
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with his bookseller, Andrew Millar, unless Millar could exploit the copyright as a
form of property. Indeed, there is some evidence that Millar was periodically
compensating Fielding according to a royalty-like arrangement, even in the absence
of any contractual obligation to do so.71
Yet in Tom Jones and much of his other work, Fielding takes an ironic view of
the property-minded author and the property-oriented text. For example, Fielding
laughs at Pope for dwelling on the Moore-Smythe story in the Dunciad. Pope,
Fielding writes, “luckily found” the six lines—as if they had gone missing and the
author had fortunately stumbled across them—”and, laying violent hands on his
own property, transferred it back again into his own works.”72 Presented here as a
literary repossession man, Pope appears obsessive, grasping, and petty, rather than
warranting sympathy as a writer simply trying to preserve his own reputation.
In a further elaboration of this mindset, Fielding writes in one of the prefatory
chapters in Tom Jones that the ideas and images of ancient writers are free for
moderns to appropriate, and then he attaches, with brilliantly self-serving logic, a
clause declaring that he nevertheless has “Property in all such sentiments they
moment they are transcribed into my Writings.”73 In this joke about modern hacks
who seek to arrogate freely available material, according to the terms of a property
claim that purports to include the “sentiments” themselves and not merely the
modern writer’s rendition of them, Fielding presents a deliberately exaggerated
picture of literary ownership which, by virtue of being so exaggerated, casts doubt
on this way of characterizing literary productions in the first place. Again, such
claims would have had no statutory basis at this time, but in satirically donning
the persona of a writer who imagines that he is entitled to make this demand,
Fielding evidently means to discredit a proprietary mindset that he had observed in
others—including, most likely, his literary rival Samuel Richardson.
In his journalistic writing, Fielding reviewed books and discussed the literary
marketplace in the persona of a judge evaluating the merits and demerits of the
parties’ claims. One such column, in The Jacobite’s Journal, finds Fielding presiding
over a mock lawsuit involving claims of infringement raised by a group of literary
hacks. He finds for the defendants on the ground that they hold a monopoly on
scurrilous language: “[W]hen Invectives procee[d] to the Use of opprobrious
Terms, and downright calling Names, such Works ha[ve] always been adjudged to
be the Property of Billingsgate.”74 The absurdly broad scope of the property claim
corresponds to an idea of literary property that encompasses not just verbatim
71. MARTIN C. BATTESTIN & RUTHE R. BATTESTIN, HENRY FIELDING: A LIFE 712 (1989)
(recording four payments from Millar for unspecified services, totaling £825.17.0, between May 1749
and December 1749, and likening these sums to payments of royalties).
72. FIELDING, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 541.
73. Id. These two examples are discussed at greater length in Simon Stern, Tom Jones and the
Economies of Copyright, 9 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FICTION 429, 438–40 (1997); see also Cook, supra
note 68, at 26.
74. HENRY FIELDING, Proceedings at the Court of Criticism, Thursday, Feb. 11, in THE
JACOBITE’S JOURNAL AND RELATED WRITINGS 159, 160 (W.B. Coley ed., 1974).
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reprinting, but any kind of writing that might compete with the source. Fielding uses
the occasion to ridicule monopolistic claims akin to those that a writer like
Richardson might appear to be raising, when complaining about other writers’
“Invasion of his Plan.” In Fielding’s fiction and journalism, the term “Property” in
association with texts invariably betrays an opportunistic and unjustified seizure. By
making the claims of proprietary authors appear so unwarranted, Fielding challenges
the underlying logic that would frame the work as an object of property.
Fielding continued to write reviews, in a similarly forensic mode, throughout
the 1740s and early 1750s. He might well have used this venue to respond to the
many imitations of his novels published during this period—such as The History of
Tom Jones, the Foundling, in His Married State (1749); The History of Charlotte Summers,
the Fortunate Parish Girl (1750; by an anonymous writer who introduces himself as
“the first Begotten, of the poetical issue, of the much celebrated Biographer of
Joseph Andrews, and Tom Jones”); The History of Pompey the Little (1750); Dr. John
Hill’s The Adventures of Mr. Loveill (1750); Edward Kimber’s The Life and Adventures
of Joe Thompson (1750); The Adventures of the Rd. Mr. Judas Hawke, the Rd. Mr. Nathan
Briggs, Miss Lucretia Briggs, &c. Late Inhabitants of the Island Querumania. After the
Manner of Joseph Andrews (1751); William Goodall’s The Adventures of Captain
Greenland (1752); and William Chaigneau’s The History of Jack Connor (1752).75 These
publications run the gamut from brilliantly Fieldingesque chronicles to mundane
and inept imitations, and under the circumstances, Fielding’s lack of comment on
these books is itself noteworthy. While he did not praise any of them or encourage
the trend, he signally failed to object to what clearly, in some instances, were merely
efforts to capitalize on his name—efforts that he might have greeted as
encroachments on his own sales.
Fielding’s silence in this respect is particularly telling in light of his complaints,
on several occasions, about unwelcome paternity claims. In what today might be
seen as a form of passing off, Fielding found himself named as the author of various
works by others, or widely credited with their authorship. Unlike the prefatory joke,
by the author of Charlotte Summers, to be Fielding’s illegitimate literary offspring,
these attributions appeared to present a more serious reputational threat. In his
preface to the second edition of Sarah Fielding’s David Simple (1744), he wrote,
[T]here are few Crimes, of which I should have been more ashamed, than
of some Writings laid to my charge. . . . Among all the Scurrilities with
which I have been accused, . . . none ever raised my Indignation so much
as the Causidicade: this accused me not only of being a bad Writer, and a

75. For discussion of these and other imitations of Fielding’s novels, see HENRY FIELDING:
THE CRITICAL HERITAGE 24–25 n.34 (Ronald Paulson & Thomas Lockwood eds., 1969); Cook, supra
note 68, at 30–31.
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bad Man, but with downright Idiotism, in flying in the Face of greatest
Men of my Profession.76
In cataloguing the harms resulting from these misattributions, Fielding explains that
they have made enemies for him—”Men whose Characters, and even Names have
been unknown to me”—and that as a result of “these Aspersions” he has
“suffered . . . cruelly in my own Ease, in my Reputation, and in my Interest.”77
Similarly, in Tom Jones, Fielding insists that while some have unfairly called him “a
very scurrilous fellow,” in fact he detests scurrility, “and what is a very severe fate,
I have had the abusive writings of those very men fathered upon me, who, in other
of their works, have abused me themselves with utmost virulence.”78 Again, in the
Covent-Garden Journal, at a time when the press was heaving with novelistic
imitations of his work, he directed his attention to “Slanders . . . wickedly fathered
upon me” rather than to any of his imitators.79 As his objections show, Fielding’s
concern in voicing these complaints involves personal insult, not market
competition. His rights relating to others’ uses of his name and works have to do
with his reputation, not his property.
Samuel Johnson’s reflections on copyright, similarly, reveal a much more
diverse array of concerns than are usually attributed to him. As one of England’s
first professional writers, Johnson’s views on literary commerce have been widely
cited, and because of his pithy and pragmatic observations on writing for money,
he is often aligned with advocates of authors’ rights as property rights. His statement
that “[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money”80 might appear to
align him with a property-based, market-oriented view of copyright, as would his
assertion in 1773, when Donaldson v. Becket was pending, that authors have “a
stronger right of property than that by occupancy; a metaphysical right, a right, as it
were, of creation, which should from its nature be perpetual.”81 Nevertheless, as
Martha Woodmansee has observed, Johnson displayed a “distinctly non-proprietary
attitude”82 in his literary practices, which included numerous collective and
collaborative projects, ranging from his work on A Dictionary of the English Language
(1755) and The Lives of the Most Eminent English Poets (1779–81) to his ghostwritten
poems for William Dodd, sermons for John Hawkins and the Reverend John
Taylor, and law lectures for Robert Chambers.83

76. Henry Fielding, Preface to SARAH FIELDING, THE ADVENTURES OF DAVID SIMPLE, iii,
v-vi (1744), reprinted in THE FLOWERING OF THE NOVEL: REPRESENTATIVE MID-EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY FICTION 1740–1775 (1974).
77. Id. at vi.
78. FIELDING, supra note 70, at 809.
79. HENRY FIELDING, THE COVENT-GARDEN JOURNAL AND A PLAN OF THE UNIVERSAL
REGISTER-OFFICE 235 (Bertrand A. Goldgar ed., Wesleyan Univ. Press 1988) (entry for May 23, 1752).
80. 3 BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (G.B. Hill ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1979).
81. 2 BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON 259 (G.B. Hill ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1979).
82. Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 279, 287 (1992).
83. Id. at 281–87.
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Moreover, after commenting on the author’s “strong[ ] right of property”
Johnson immediately added that a perpetual term would be unwise, because “reason
and the interests of learning are against it”: once the author decides to publish, the
work “should be understood as no longer in his power, but as belonging to the
publick; at the same time the author is entitled to an adequate reward. This he should
have by an exclusive right to his work for a number of years.”84 Equally
significantly, Johnson understood this exclusive right as a right against unauthorized
reproduction, not a right against imitative or derivative uses. As early as 1739,
Johnson was already defending abridgment as a permissible and desirable practice:
“[E]very book, when it falls into the hands of the reader, is liable to be examined,
confuted, censured, translated, and abridged; any of which may destroy the credit
of the authour, or hinder the sale of the book.” Even if the author’s sales are
diminished, that is no justification for prohibiting abridgment, because “these
inconveniences give way to the advantage received by mankind from the easier
propagation of knowledge,” a goal that matters more than the claim of “the
proprietors of a particular book [to] enjoy their profits undiminished.” The author’s
or bookseller’s rights in “the copy of a book” are therefore subject to the “hazard
of an abridgment [as] an original condition of the property.”85
Johnson plainly understood copyright as a property right, and as a right to
control access to a market commodity, but he nevertheless saw it as a very limited
property right—a right to prevent unauthorized reprints, but not a right against any
rendition of the author’s argument that might compete with the author’s version.
Johnson’s example reminds us that even when writers invoked the language of
property, they may not have had the view of copyright’s scope that modern
conceptions of copyright take for granted. The question of how to prevent market
substitutes is one of the central concerns informing contemporary scholarship on
copyright, and this concern is intimately linked to the invocation of a property
framework—but Johnson was capable of drawing on the latter without much heed
for the former.
What Johnson says about abridgments applies with even more force to
imitative writing. Indeed, the mid-eighteenth century witnessed a flourishing of
analyses of literary imitation, largely aimed at explaining why imitation was
inevitable and when it was worthy of admiration. These defenses take it for granted
that imitation is permissible (rarely even contemplating the possibility that the
84. 2 BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON, supra note 81, at 159.
85. Samuel Johnson, Considerations on the Case of Dr. Trapp’s Sermons, Abridged by Mr. Cave,
1739, reprinted in 11 ARTHUR MURPHY, THE WORKS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 467, 472 (1837). In Dodsley
v. Kinnersley (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270; Amb. 403, Johnson’s publisher, Robert Dodsley, attempted
unsuccessfully to sue another publisher for abridging Rasselas (1759) by reprinting it with the moral
reflections excised. “[Dodsley’s] argument rested on the fact that the best parts, the moral reflections,
had been edited from the abridgment and only the plot remained. This was his only course of action
because in 1761 the one [potentially] successful argument against the abridgment [was] that the
abridgment devalued rather than enhanced Johnson’s novel.” William J. Howard, Literature in the Law
Courts, 1770–1800, in EDITING EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY TEXTS 78, 87 (D.I.B. Smith ed., 1968).
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author’s property claim might prohibit such efforts); by implication, it is the
prevalence of the practice that necessitates an explanation of good versus bad
imitation. One of Johnson’s earliest works announced its affiliation with Gulliver’s
Travels, in precisely the way that Richardson found offensive: titled “Appendix to
Capt. Lemuel Gulliver’s Account of the Famous Empire of Lilliput,”86 the essay
was an introductory foray into the parliamentary reporting that Johnson published
in the Gentleman’s Magazine as “Debates in the Senate of Lilliput.”87 Swift, who did
not share Richardson’s view of authors’ rights, seems to have had nothing to say
about this effort.
Again, in a discussion of imitative writing in a Rambler essay of 1751, Johnson
warns that “interest or envy” often inspires those who “live upon literary fame to
disturb each other at their airy banquets” by leveling “the charge of plagiarism.”
This is an expedient, he notes, “by which the author may be degraded, though his
work be reverenced and . . . set at such a distance as not to overpower our fainter
lustre”—an observation hinting that such attacks are prompted by spite more than
concerns about the protection of property. A rival who claimed to detect a property
violation, after all, presumably would not be satisfied to “degrad[e]” the author and
to accept a “fainter lustre” but instead would insist on demanding the limelight that
had been misdirected, or, if purporting to detect plagiarism from another source,
would claim to be a rightful (non-imitative) property-holder, as against an
illegitimate one. Johnson offers a number of reasons for doubting that similarities
necessarily indicate copying, and he establishes, in seemingly forensic terms, a high
standard of proof for those who would bring such charges: “[T]here [must be] a
concurrence of more resemblance than can be imagined to have happened by
chance . . . where not only the thought but the words are copied.” Finally, he
concludes that imitation should be encouraged: “[N]ot every imitation ought to be
stigmatized as plagiarism. The adoption of a noble sentiment, or the insertion of a
borrowed ornament, may sometimes display so much judgment as will almost
compensate for invention” and there need be no “imputation of servility” in a
writer’s decision to “pursue the path of the ancients.”88 As a lexicographer, editor,
journalist, and essayist, as well as a poet and novelist, Johnson was well situated to
understand the publishing marketplace, and while he unambiguously describes the
protection afforded by the Statute of Anne in terms of property, his comments on
literary commerce show that he did not take a primarily property-oriented view of
copyright. He understood the right against unauthorized reprinting as a crucial
requirement for protecting the author’s profits, but saw no ground for extending
copyright protection any further.

86. 8 GENTLEMAN’S MAG. 283 (1738).
87. On the series, see DONALD GREENE, THE POLITICS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 92–95
(Univ. Ga. Press 1990).
88. SAMUEL JOHNSON, 143 THE RAMBLER ( July 30, 1751), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF
SAMUEL JOHNSON (W.J. Bate & Albrecht B. Strauss eds., Yale Univ. Press 1969).
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III. PROPERTY AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LITERARY CULTURE
Turning from particular writers to literary practices more generally, we see that
some of the conventions of eighteenth-century writing offer additional means of
understanding the role of property in the authorial imagination at this time.
Throughout this period, novels often included a preface in which the author claimed
to have discovered the manuscript in an old desk, or to have received it as part of a
bargain.89 The reasons for this device are various—to create distance between the
author or narrator and the text, to lend the work an air of authenticity if it claimed
to describe historical events, or conversely to emphasize the artifice that permeates
the narrative enterprise. What is notable for present purposes is that, despite the
many examples of this prefatory device, the question of property in the text hardly
ever arises. In one of the most famous instances, Henry Mackenzie’s The Man of
Feeling (1771), the narrator begins by explaining how he acquired the manuscript
from an acquaintance who considered it to be “excellent wadding” for his gun,
having originally found it in “a bundle of papers” left among the author’s effects
when he moved.90 Mackenzie himself was trained as a lawyer (and eventually
became a specialist in revenue disputes in the court of exchequer),91 but the novel’s
preface never considers the question of whether publishing the text constitutes a
violation of the true author’s property right. That the preface is laced with irony, as
many critics have observed,92 cannot by itself explain this absence: one who evinces
an ironic perspective on authorship, fame, and worldly commerce might also take
the opportunity to engage in ironic reflections about property and the possibility of
litigation (as we saw in Fielding’s example). Rather, the implication is that
Mackenzie—like so many other writers who drew on the same conceit in their
prefaces—did not regard the convention of the “found manuscript” as a useful
springboard for a discussion of authorial property.
Perhaps the most striking example of this convention appears in Tobias
Smollett’s The Expedition of Humphry Clinker, also published in 1771. There,
Smollett’s characters do ask about the legal consequences that might follow from
the unauthorized publication of a misappropriated manuscript—but instead of
framing the issue in terms of property, they focus on reputational questions. The
novel opens with a pair of letters between one Jonathan Dustwich, who has acquired
the letters that comprise the novel, and Henry Davis, a London bookseller who has
some concerns about the legality of the publishing them without permission.

89. The convention has not received much sustained critical attention. Among the few
discussions to examine it at length are John Dolan, Poetry, “Fiction” and Prose in Found Texts of the
1760s, 28 GENRE 35 (1995); Ian Duncan, Authenticity Effects: The Work of Fiction in Romantic Scotland,
102 S. ATLANTIC Q. 93 (2003); Anthony J. Hassall, Sarah and Henry Fielding and the Authorship of The
History of Ophelia: Literary Considerations, 30 SCRIPT & PRINT 93 (2006).
90. HENRY MACKENZIE, THE MAN OF FEELING 4 (Brian Vickers ed., 2002).
91. HAROLD WILLIAM THOMPSON, A SCOTTISH MAN OF FEELING 81 (1931).
92. See, e.g., ALEX WETMORE, MEN OF FEELING IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LITERATURE:
TOUCHING FICTION 7 (2013); Leo Braudy, The Form of the Sentimental Novel, 7 NOVEL 5 (1973).
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Fending off the “objections” raised by the bookseller in a previous letter (not
included in the text), Dustwich writes, “[A]s touching what prosecutions may arise
from printing the private correspondence of persons still living, . . . the Letters in
question were not written and sent under the seal of secrecy; [and] they have no
tendency to the mala fama, or prejudice of any person whatsoever.”93 Moreover, he
claims, according to an “eminent attorney” whom he has consulted, “the said
Letters [do not] contain any matter which will be held actionable in the eye of the
law.”94 Finally, as “to the manner in which I got possession of these Letters, it is a
circumstance that concerns my own conscience only,”95 and so the bookseller need
not concern himself with such questions. On receiving these reassurances, Davis
replies that he would be happy to discuss terms.
A striking feature of this correspondence is that questions of property never
arise. Dustwich evidently has not asked at least some (or, more likely, any) of the
correspondents whether he may print the letters, but he and Davis consider
themselves free to proceed, so long as there is no risk of libel suit. Smollett addresses
legal issues in many of his novels,96 and yet here—in one of the few cases when any
writer took such elaborate pains to ironize the prefatory convention and to ponder
its implications for literary commerce—he glosses over the subject of property.
Doubtless, one effect of the exchange between Dustwich and Davis is to elevate
Smollett above the crass motivations that he ascribes to the battered and slippery
denizens of the literary marketplace who open the book—but that can hardly
explain why concerns about property are absent, since that topic would only
underscore the mercenary attitudes of the two correspondents. Smollett shows no
interest in this aspect of the conventional story about the “found manuscript”;
instead, like many of his contemporaries, he associates the unauthorized publication
of a manuscript with questions about injury to one’s character.
The absence of contentions about property is even more notable when one
turns to the various allegations of plagiarism among eighteenth-century writers and
critics. Allegations of plagiarism are closely tied to accusations of theft—and the
eighteenth century is no exception to this pattern—but throughout this era, we
rarely find complaints that translate these charges into the seemingly obvious

93. TOBIAS SMOLLETT, THE EXPEDITION OF HUMPHRY CLINKER 1 (Lewis M. Knapp
ed., Paul-Gabriel Boucé rev. 1998).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2.
96. See CHERYL L. NIXON, THE ORPHAN IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LAW AND LITERATURE:
ESTATE, BLOOD, AND BODY 228–56 (2011); Hilary Teynor Donatini, Smollett’s Justices, 23 AGE OF
JOHNSON 273 (2015); Roger A. Hambridge, Smollett’s Legalese: Giles Jacob’s New Law Dictionary and
Sir Launcelot Greaves, 44 REVUE DES LANGUES VIVANTES 37 (1978); Peter Miles, The Bookhood of
Humphry Clinker: The Editor, the Publisher, and the Law, 18 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LIFE 48 (1994);
Alice Parker, Tobias Smollett and the Law, 39 STUD. PHILOLOGY 545 (1942); Nicole Wright, Stand
“Yore” Ground: Atavistic Justice and the Rights of Outsiders in The Life and Adventures of Sir Launcelot
Greaves, in Standing for the Powerless: Legal Agency After the Enlightenment (Nicole M. Wright
ed.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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conclusion that the plagiarist has committed an offense against the author’s
property.
Richard Terry, who has conducted the most extensive study of allegations
about plagiarism in the eighteenth century, notes that even as the term began to
encompass accusations about “the copying of ideas and expressions,”97 and even
though the term was often accompanied by complaints about theft, it rarely included
the sense that this kind of copying was a property offense. Gerard Langbaine’s
Momus Triumphans was one of the first sustained efforts to catalogue examples of
literary plagiarism; as Terry notes,
Though Langbaine sees himself as restoring stolen material to its rightful
owners, he is not appealing to some high principle concerning the
inalienable nature of individual creativity. What moves him rather is the
prospect of the great writers suffering an erosion of their fames, as their
credit is embezzled and spirited away by plagiarists. . . . Not only does he
not invoke the concept of property or “propriety,” he never considers the
affront of plagiarism in monetary terms.98
Terry sees precisely the same pattern repeated throughout the eighteenth century:
While plagiarism was certainly viewed by authors as being pernicious, the
idea that what it specifically infringed was an author’s property right seems
to have very little currency in the period itself. Much more common was
the idea that plagiarism constituted a rape against the author’s credit or
fame . . . . by the same token, when writers express indignation about
unfair accusations of plagiarism, they tend to bemoan not the challenge to
their ownership of property but to their entitlement to fame.99
Discussing a wide range of authors including John Dryden, Aphra Behn, Joseph
Addison, Alexander Pope, Samuel Johnson, Henry and Sarah Fielding, Laurence
Sterne, and Charlotte Smith, Terry shows that accusations of plagiarism almost
invariably targeted reputational issues, and that, during the period when the
bookselling industry was busily advancing a property-oriented view of copyright,
writers were more concerned with questions of character and respectability when
they argued about illicit copying.
CONCLUSION
The logic of property law has significantly influenced the development of
copyright doctrine since around the middle of the nineteenth century, particularly
in the context of derivative use and infringement for nonliteral copying. When
copyright scholars discuss the law’s expansion and its increasing propertization,
these are the changes they have in mind. Discussion of literary property may be
found in many eighteenth-century sources, including judicial opinions, letters,
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polemical pamphlets, and newspaper articles, as well as essays, fiction, and poetry.
However, when we examine these sources, we rarely encounter the expansive view
of the property right that modern copyright law carries with it; hence the mere
appearance of the word property should not lead us to conclude that this period had
already witnessed the propertization that commentators have described as a
comparatively recent phenomenon. Again, when we look more closely at the
writings of poets and novelists during the eighteenth century, we find that even
when they speak of property and the rights it imports, these authors rarely take the
same view of the subject that the bookselling industry was seeking to promote.
Instead, writers tended to hold a very qualified conception of the property right, or
to invoke it only to cast aspersions on it. The few who took the same position as
the booksellers were affiliated, in some way, with the publishing trade. Finally, even
the legal decisions that are sometimes offered as evidence of the early propertization
of copyright law may turn out, when examined carefully, to have been misread.
What becomes evident, from this examination of a range of eighteenth-century
materials, is that when seeking to understand the history of legal concepts, we
cannot be content simply to search for familiar language in older sources; instead,
we must ask, in each instance, how the language is being used, who is using it, and
for what purposes.

